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Abstract 
This work examines the discourse of the Crimean crisis. It explores the development of  
national identities of Russia and Ukraine, from historical roots to modernity, in the context of 
political discursive encounters. This work is focused on the struggle for legitimization, the 
Other, and the states as actors that emerge in the discourse. 
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Those who know do not speak. 
Those who speak do not know. 
 
Lao Tzu, Tao Teh Ching 
 
 
And those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it. However, the patterns 
that supposedly repeat themselves can be interpreted in the different ways.  
The events in Crimea, as well as the revolution that had taken place in Ukraine before, 
have been a subject of different interpretation from the very beginning. Like many 
revolutions, this one was not an isolated event relevant within the borders of one single 
country, and ultimately proved a triggering point for what could possibly become a change to 
the world order as we know it. It remains to be seen whether this new world will be 
constructed in terms of a zero-sum military-inspired realist standoff, or whether a new 
interpretation of the reality might be possible. 
Discourse and identity are strongly linked, which could be seen every party’s notably 
different discourse on the Crimean crisis. The EU’s approach, reflecting its difficulties to 
balance the positions of the member states, as well as the stronger power language used by the 
US, are mirrored by the Russia’s no-compromise rhetoric justifying their course of actions, 
while Ukraine employs appeals to international law and to emotions alike. In a discursive 
struggle, political actors are attempting to balance their right to speak with the vision of the 
future for their states.  
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The aim of this work is to explore the process of identity-building by analyzing the 
discourse of the Crimean conflict. How is it seen by the different parties? How do they wish 
to be seen? And, finally, what kind of actors are emerging from this standoff?  
Studying any conflict requires knowledge of context, as well as cultural and historical 
background. In case of Crimea the commonplaces invoked in the media and official speeches 
contain references to the complicated history between Ukraine and Russia, the language issue, 
the specific linguistic code formerly utilized by the Soviet propaganda and Ukrainian 
nationalist moves, as well as the new ideologically-backed war rhetoric and technical legal 
speak. We are witnessing more than informational war; the discourse contributes to 
establishing and re-establishing of the actors and their identity, and possibly re-writing history 
in the most direct sense. 
As a native speaker of both Ukrainian and Russian with the knowledge of the history of 
the relations between the two states, born in the USSR and having studied on the other side of 
the former Iron Curtain, I will attempt to deconstruct and systematize the discourse tools 
employed by the respective parties. The goal of my research is to explore the role of the 
Crimean crisis discourse on the identity-building of the two states. 
The first chapter of the thesis will focus on the historical discursive background of 
Ukraine-Russia relations. The second chapter will contain theoretical background of the 
discourse and identity-building. The third chapter will be devoted to the analysis of the data 
derived from the speeches and interviews of the political actors, official sources, as well as 
Russian and Ukrainian media. In the end, the conclusions and ideas for further research will 
follow. 
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Chapter 1. Literature Review And Historical Discourse On Ukraine And Russia 
1.1. State, Language And War. From IX AD To 1945 
History is necessary for understanding of the images and references utilized in the 
discourse, as well as for placing the discourse development in the context. Even for a history 
student providing an overview of several centuries of history narrative would be a more than 
ambitious task; to give the necessary background for this thesis, this first chapter will be 
dedicated to a selective description of the most well-known historical events, personalities and 
cultural references that are featured both in media and official documents, being well 
recognized by the public beyond scientific circles.   
A good starting point would be the subject of Kyivan Rus’, a European state that existed 
in IX-XIII AD and covered a big part of the modern territory of Ukraine, as well as some of 
Belarus and Russia. According to one of the theories, Rus was originally a term for the 
Scandinavian settlers, and later for the mercenaries and traders active on the territory that 
would later be known as Kyivan state, or Kyivan Rus’. Its capital Kiev was subsequently 
called “the mother of Russian cities”. According to Ukrainian historiography, its statehood 
originated in Kyivan Rus’(Subtel’nyi, 1993). Therefore, these are the former lands of Kyivan 
Rus’ that are now called “Ukraine” – a name that was first mentioned in the XII century but 
didn’t get wide recognition until the end of the XIX century. According to popular belief, it 
phonetically corresponds to “okraina”, meaning “borderland”; according to scientific sources, 
the original meaning included “separate territory”, “a land of its own” (Pivtorak, 2001). Later 
it was allegedly distorted by Russian imperial propaganda to mean “the border of Russian 
state”, in order to justify the idea of a single statehood for two nations, “assigning to this word 
humiliating meaning, not inherent to it” (Pivtorak, 2001: 121). 
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This is just one of the examples of politics and ideology creeping into historical analysis 
(more than usual) by means of inclusion of the strongly worded sentiments. The current 
Russian historical and cultural standard on teaching history includes Kievan Rus’ as the 
birthplace of its own statehood, albeit putting it on the list of “difficult historical questions”, 
which are “subject to acute discussions”. Notably, Ukraine becoming a part of Russia is on 
that list as well (Ministry of Science and Education of the Russian Federation, Historical and 
cultural standard on teaching history, 2013). 
Thus Russia and Ukraine (as well as Belarus) claim Kyivan Rus’ as the origin of their 
statehood. It was not an issue during the times of Russian Empire, or the USSR, when the two 
states were united under a single political denominator and thus it mattered less which of the 
two had the primary claim. Things changed, however, after the breakup of the USSR: in 
search of the renewed state identity both countries went to lay claim to the land of Rus. The 
sentiment of a “rogue” borderland that should rightfully return to “Mother Russia”, which was 
partly facilitated by the name “Russia” itself, was counteracted by the story of the name theft 
committed by the greedy empire from the state with the capital in Kyiv. 
Most of modern Ukraine’s territory became part of Russia in 1654 after the Pereyaslav 
Council, when Ukraine’s immensely popular hetman (a military leader) Bohdan 
Khmel’nyts’kyi entered into alliance with Russian empire. This step remains another 
controversial historical fact.  Its interpretations are ranging from the fated re-union of the 
Slavic people (exploited, among others, by the Soviet propaganda as part of its universalist 
identity-building) to state treason and condemnation of Ukrainian people to the Moscow yoke 
(favored by modern Ukrainian historians). 
Like many nations being a part of a bigger state formation and feeling the right to self-
determination, Ukrainian nation had a number of intellectuals contributing to the discussion 
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about the nation’s history and future.  Initially they were mostly members of the “folkist” 
circles of students and young city intellectuals (“folkist” is an approximate translation of the 
term “narodnyky”, where “narod” means “folk”, “people”; not to be confused with the 
modern “folkish”). The somewhat vague political position of these youngsters manifested in 
the provocative wearing of “vyshyvanka”, an upper garment of folk village clothing, as well 
as in studying folklore and publishing works on Ukraine’s cultural heritage in Ukrainian 
language. 
Despite their seeming meekness, the activities could be considered an anti-state 
disobedience: in XVII-XVIII centuries around twenty state- and church-issued bans on 
publishing and education in Ukrainian language have been introduced in Russian empire. One 
of the most often cited of these bans was Valuyev’s circular from 1863, which censored the 
printing of spiritual and popular scientific literature in Ukrainian due to the fact that “there is 
no and cannot be any separate Maloros language” (Malorossiya means “little Russia”, the 
name assigned to modern Ukrainian territory that was a part of Russian empire). In the 
subsequent Ems order from1876 tsar Alexander II prohibited printing and importing of any 
Ukrainian-language literature. The prohibition also included Ukrainian theatrical 
performances and printing of Ukrainian texts on sheet music, effectively disabling any 
performance of national songs. After Ukraine gained independence in 1991, Ukrainian 
historical narrative has focused on the language prohibitions as the examples of Russian 
oppression, implying a strong tie between language and identity. Meanwhile, Russian 
historians point out that the Ems order has by its crudeness only hindered the successfully 
proceeding assimilation of Ukrainians into the linguistically and culturally dominant Russian 
society (Miller, 2000). This point of view is not unfounded, with Russian being the language 
of the richer classes of Ukrainian society, giving access to most of the works of art, education 
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and societal connections. Lifestyle of Ukrainian elite was closely connected to the Russian 
language and society – the trend that persisted until the beginning of the XX century, and 
further on through the years of existence of the USSR. Ukrainian language and culture 
occupied the position of the quaint folk curiosities, somewhat entertaining but ultimately 
inferior to the progressive (and more international) Russian culture. 
To this day language remains a strong aspect of identity for diverse groups of 
Ukrainians, such as the exclusively Ukrainian-speaking Western Ukrainians, the Russophones 
of the East and the Crimea, the fluently bilingual citizens of Kyiv and other big cities, as well 
as for the distinctive Tatar, Greek and other minorities with non-Slavic native languages. For 
the majority of the population, Ukrainian and Russian languages have continued to coexist for 
centuries, both purely and in forms of many dialects, with the overwhelming majority of 
Ukrainians remaining bilingual.  
The end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century marked a spike in the amount 
and quality of works on Ukraine’s history and the future of its self-determination. The need 
for change became apparent, and the turbulent pre-war world order could provide 
opportunities for such change. A number of works that emerged in that time period have 
become classics, despite the fact that, except for a short period after their initial publication, 
some of them and their authors were largely unknown before the beginning of the 90’s when 
the Soviet censorship expired. Overall, those historical and political works demonstrated two 
main trends, which can be loosely described as moderate and radical.  
The moderate one was mainly represented by Hrushevs’kyi and Dragomanov, being 
fairly typical for the Russia-integrated Ukrainian intellectual elite of the time. Their names are 
widely known in Ukraine, both to history scientists and schoolchildren. Hrushevs’kyi is the 
author of more than two thousand works on Ukrainian and Russian history, language and 
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culture; he has composed some fundamental works, such as “Illustrated history of Ukraine” 
(1913) and the eleven tomes of the “History of Ukraine-Rus” (1895-1933). These works have 
received warm reception both among Russian and Ukrainian intellectuals, and a number of 
reviews noted that these works have filled the void on the comprehensive overview of the 
history of Ukraine (Telvak, 2006). 
Hrushevs’kyi is also notable for his work as a political leader. In 1914-1918 he has been 
acting as a head of Central Council, the representative organ of Ukrainian people. The 
Council has been aspiring for autonomy with wider rights, and gradually came to the decision 
to declare Ukraine’s independence in January 1918. This was the first attempt in centuries to 
establish independence, which failed due to external political circumstances. It warrants a 
brief mention that Ukraine’s interim government in 2014 has been compared  to the “Central 
Council 2.0”, referring to both its indecisiveness and harsh external circumstances, under 
which it has been forced to operate (Bezuglyi, 2014)  
Dragomanov was another representative of the “moderate” wing. His political and 
historical works focused on the idea of democratization of Russia with its subsequent 
decentralization, which would enable freedoms for Ukraine without trying to achieve full 
independence (Dragomanov, 1917). His ideas have influenced a great deal of thinkers and 
have remained dominant among the Ukrainian elites of that time, which could also be 
observed as a part of the activity of the Central Council. 
The radical trend was characterized by Ukrainian nationalistic views, which included 
not only the right to self-determination in an independent state, but also a number of explicit 
anti-Russian sentiments. The most well-known author, who remains popular among the 
modern Ukrainian nationalists, is Dmytro Dontsov. He has been advocating civilizational 
incompatibility of Russia and Ukraine, and the necessity for the latter to break away to enable 
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its own development and progress. The names of his books on the subject are telling enough – 
“Modern moscowfilia” (1913), “The culture of primitivism” (1918); his later work, “The 
foundations of our policies” (1957), states the incompatibility of “Moscow state” with 
European values. Dontsov has profusely criticized the “moderate” Dragomanov for his 
“provincial” views, as well as for his ideas of any kind of union with Russia in particular. 
These radical views haven’t become widespread among either Ukrainian elites or the popular 
masses at that time. 
Despite being considered its founder, it is not Dontsov who has been featured in the 
critique of Ukrainian nationalism. Modern discourse around Ukrainian nationalism (including 
alleged fascism) features terms “banderivtsi” (“Bandera supporters”) and even 
“banderophobia”; the discourse around Crimean events has linked the Kiev government with 
“banderivtsi” and fascism in order to delegitimize it. The use of such judicial rhetoric stems 
from a complicated historical background, which I will briefly present below. 
Bandera is the most well-known and the most controversial figure of the history of 
Ukrainian nationalism and its fight for Ukraine’s independence. Unlike Dontsov, who was 
born in the South-Eastern Ukraine and studied in Russia, Stepan Bandera’s life and activity 
was centered in the Western Ukrainian territories, which had been part of Poland until their 
annexation by the USSR in 1939. The latter act is also known as “the reunion of Ukrainian 
people in a united Ukrainian Soviet state, the liberation by the Soviet Union of the ancient 
Ukrainian lands…from the oppression of the foreign occupants, and their subsequent 
inclusion to the…USSR, according to the unanimous will of their population”(Ukrainian 
Soviet Encyclopedia, 1974-85: tome 2). Born in 1909, Bandera started taking part in 
resistance movements against the “polonization” of Ukrainians as early as 1920, becoming the 
head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) at the age of 24.  
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The organization has carried out a great number of subversive activities, including 
assassinations and arsons, in their fight against “occupants”, both Polish and Soviet, as well as 
attacks against “traitorous” Ukrainians. The most controversial part of the OUN activities was 
cooperation with the Nazi powers against the Soviet powers later during the Second World 
War. The cooperation was short-lived, since the independency aspirations of the organization 
were in direct confrontation with the plans of Nazi Germany; after the Act of Restoration of 
Ukrainian Statehood was proclaimed in 1941, all chief activists of OUN were arrested. After 
the end of the war the OUN units continued anti-Soviet guerrilla war in the Western Ukraine, 
which remained a part of the Ukrainian Soviet republic. Bandera himself remained in the 
German concentration camp till 1944, and in 1959 he was assassinated by a KGB agent in 
Munich. In the last years of his life he has produced a number of works, arguing the necessity 
of the breakup of the USSR and the subsequent creation of a number of independent states. 
Russia, in his views, possessed “a deep-rooted, and in these days most inflamed possessive 
imperialism”, resulting in “most fanatic attack on Ukraine in order to keep it as a part of its 
empire or to enslave it anew” (Bandera, 1948:9). 
Both representatives of radical trend, Dontsov and Bandera, have argued for 
independence of Ukraine with complete breakaway from Russia. Their views were considered 
too controversial by the overwhelming part of Ukraine’s population, and the violent methods 
and questionable collaboration tactics of OUN haven’t gained much sympathy either. A 
Ukrainian historian Stepyko (2011) mentions Bandera and “banderivtsi”, speaking of 
stereotypes associated with the term for the average Russian: “anti-ideal” of Ukraine, “bad” 
Ukraine, while the “good” Ukraine is Malorossiya, meaning “little Russia”, under control of 
Moscow (Stepyko, 2011: 270). “Banderivtsi” for the longest time remained a slur for radical 
nationalism native to Western Ukraine, distrusted or even despised in the rest of the country. 
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Soviet propaganda has naturally contributed to the negative image of the nationalist 
movement, in part due to its aspirations for independency; however, the years after 1991 did 
little to change the remaining mostly negative view. 
To sum up, the discursive competition on statehood origin and dominant language 
found its logical continuation in the moderate and radical approaches to co-existence of the 
two states. The moderate one focused on the idea of democratization of Russia with its 
subsequent decentralization, which would enable freedoms for Ukraine without trying to 
achieve full independence; this approach enjoyed support of both Russian and Ukrainian 
elites. The radical trend was characterized by Ukrainian nationalistic views, which included 
not only the right to self-determination in an independent state, but also a number of explicit 
anti-Russian sentiments and the necessity to “break away” in order to achieve civilizational 
development and statehood success. 
1.2. What Now? Soviet And Post-Soviet Identity Discourse 
The Soviet discourse reflected the attempt to construct a new state model by 
deliberating on a new model of the future.  The way to resolve the existing issues was a 
compromise of sorts: the competing origins of statehood were to be leveled by the absence of 
national borders between the Soviet states, while the cultural superiority was rendered 
irrelevant by the lack of cultural distinctiveness etc. Soviet internationalism nominally 
discouraged both Russian and Ukrainian distinctive self-identity, striving to create a “Soviet 
human”, whose identity would transcend borders and origin to be firmly rooted in ideology 
and economics. However, in the end the emerging Homo Soveticus was clearly dominated by 
Russian influence (starting with linguistic prevalence of Russian language, visible up to this 
day), rather than being a multicultural combination of the many nations of the USSR. 
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A century after, with Ukraine and Russia de-jure independent, the joint past within the 
two subsequent empires is still haunting both states.  It is no wonder that Ukrainian post-
independent revision of history included clear anti-Soviet trend, such as publicizing the details 
of oppressions (unlawful arrests, censorship etc) and stressing the key role of Russian element 
in them. In the 90’s the works of Ukrainian writers and poets, censored because of their anti-
regime contents, were printed en masse and included into the school literature plans. At the 
same time, a number of the new historical facts were made public (for instance, Holodomor 
(the artificial hunger), previously interpreted as natural disaster, was now presented as an act 
of Soviet genocide of Ukrainian people). Another controversial issue was the discussion about 
awarding the OUN members the status of war combatants of the World War II, thus granting 
them equal rights with the war veterans of the Soviet army they had been fighting against. 
A Ukrainian scientist Stepyko (2011) in his work on formation of Ukrainian political 
identity argues that Russia has been exercising influence on the ethnic Russians outside its 
borders by utilizing the geopolitical concept of “Russian world”. Fournier (2010) mentions a 
similar “imperial concept” of “Slavic brotherhood”, as well as “imperial political discourse” 
(Fournier, 2010: 417). According to Stepyko (2011), it is based on the dominant in Russian 
ethnology constructivist theory of nation. The Kievan Rus’ as a common birthplace of two 
nations is used to justify their “historical unity”. This approach clashed noticeably with the 
Ukrainian approach to define their identity “precisely in opposition to Russia” (Duncan, 2005: 
285). Additionally, the overview in the previous section of the works of the authors with the 
Ukrainian nationalistic views has already demonstrated the recurring Western, pro-European 
theme as opposed to the oppression of the coexistence with Russia. 
Duncan (2005) argues that “Ethnic Russians were encouraged to identify with the 
Russian empire as a whole, rather than develop a national solidarity amongst themselves” 
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(Duncan, 2005: 283). Later on, according to him, the Soviet Union has actually contributed to 
Russian identity-building, despite its proclaimed multicultural character. “The use of the 
Russian language, the dominance of ethnic Russians in the leadership, and the sense of the 
defeat of Nazi Germany as a Russian national victory all encouraged ethnic Russians to 
identify with the USSR” (Duncan, 2005: 283). 
The Soviet regime strived to remove class differences. This initiative was not entirely 
successful, resulting in the appearance of party elites with access to better consumer goods, 
places of recreation and trips abroad. However, compared to the previous regime, more 
equality (and quality) in level of life for the general population has been achieved, which 
became another contributing factor to the strong Soviet component in the identity-building for 
the Russians. In the context of identity-building, this equality meant also the effective 
disappearance of Westernized nobility.  Predated by the debates between Westernizers and 
Slavophiles about the “unique path” of Russia, anti-Western sentiment became a part of the 
Soviet ideological campaign, and thus a part of creating an “Other”. 
In the years after the breakup of the USSR, Russian historical discourse has moved from 
denouncing the Soviet past and honoring the victims of the Soviet regime to the new version 
of “history politics” (Miller, 2011). This revision of the historical past to suit the aims of the 
present political elite was carried out by adopting through the years 2003-2009 a number of 
measures aimed at establishing control over history interpretations. The measures included a 
new revised schoolbook, obligatory for studying; newly created political structures who 
“filtered” the archives material being made available to public under the guise of carrying out 
research; finally, an attempt was made to adopt the law criminalizing the “wrong” 
interpretation of the World War II and the role of the USSR in it. All these elements received 
ideological backup and legitimation (see Miller and Lipman, 2012). 
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The above-mentioned Soviet identity (along with a Soviet nostalgia) remained firmly 
rooted in Crimea. It happened, in part, due to a specific population structure. In 1944 Joseph 
Stalin ordered mass deportation of Crimean Tatars, citing collaborationism with the Nazi 
Germany as reason. In less than two days from 150 to 238 thousand people were deported to 
other parts of the USSR, with up to 50% estimated mortality rate on the way and during the 
first month of the “special settlement” regime (Abdulganiyev, 2002).  
The territory “vacated” in such manner was offered for settlement to emigrants from 
Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), which resulted in the prevalence of ethnic Russians 
on the peninsula. Additionally, It has remained a popular retirement place for the marines, 
including in the post-independence time, when Russian navy retained the right to be stationed 
in their Crimean bases. Thus the Russian-dominated and Soviet-oriented population structure 
has remained after the Tatars got the possibility to return to their homeland, to engage in 
protracted legal struggle with Soviet Crimean authorities and the “thoroughly Sovietized” 
local Russian community, “known for their long-standing and deep Communist loyalties” 
(Abdulganiyev, 2002). As a result, after the split of the USSR the Crimea has hosted two 
conflicting identities, while both the local and the Kiev governments did little to ease tensions 
and foster mutual tolerance and cooperation. 
Needless to say, the “Ukrainization” of Crimea after it unexpectedly became a part of 
the independent Ukraine hasn’t happened in any way but nominal.  Neither has 
Europeanization, or “nativization” by the indigenous Tatars, who came to be seen as intruders 
rather than the wronged party. Stepyko (2011) attributes the resistance to Ukrainization 
among the Russian minorities in Ukraine to the fact that Russian identity and culture have 
been historically considered more prestigious, prospective, and superior, in contrast to 
Ukrainian equivalents (which had been mentioned in the previous section of this paper). Thus 
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the effort to unite Crimea with the rest of Ukraine based on “Ukrainianness” was doomed 
from the start. For the ethnic Russians living on its territory it would mean abandoning the 
Soviet mindset of an entitled nation and a return to “something previously rejected, 
undesirable” (Stepyko, 2011:219). 
In case of Crimea, the breakup of the USSR meant a forceful establishment of the 
border with Russia, a breakaway from the country that most people residing on the peninsular 
associated with the USSR and wanted to be associated with, and which they strived to 
preserve culturally, if not politically. It was in this context that the widely cited phrase of 
Putin was uttered: the “greatest geopolitical tragedy” was not the breakup of the USSR per se, 
but the fact that many ethnic Russians found themselves outside Russian territory, on the side 
of the previously non-existent border (“A Message to the Federal Assembly”, 2005). 
It can be seen in this brief overview of the historical background that the identity 
formation in Ukraine and Russia has been a complex, mutually dependent and problematic 
process, which is still ongoing and bringing up all the unresolved issues from the past. In 
order to give clarity to the presented discourses, they will be summarized in the table below, 
based on Hansen (2006). 
Table 1 
Historical Discourses of Russian and Ukrainian Identity 
Identity 
Discourse 
Ukrainian identity Russian identity 
Panslavic Unity Little Russia, part of Slavic 
civilization 
State unity with Russia 
Assimilation 
Mother Russia, inalienable 
rights to Ukraine 
State dominance 
Superior culture 
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Federalization 
Union of Nations 
Self-determination in union with 
Russia 
Recognizing the cultural 
superiority of Russia 
Leading civilizational role in 
creating of a new nation 
Dominating the brotherhood of 
states 
Civilizational 
Incompatibility 
Russia as oppressor 
Breaking ties with Russia to 
enable future development 
 
European state 
Strong state with unique path 
Russophone-populated areas as 
a sphere of priority interests  
Combatting Western military 
and cultural influence; image of 
the Other 
 
Overall, the competing identity-building has been an essential part of both Ukrainian 
and Russian historiographical discourse. This “spiritual journey” was far from being complete 
at the moment of Maidan and Crimean events, both of which gave new zeal to another stage 
of discursive competition between the two. The next chapter will provide the theoretical 
framework on the identity building and the roles of speaking parties in the process. 
Chapter 2.  Discourse And Identity: Theoretical Framework 
 “Foreign policy discourses articulate and intertwine material factors and ideas to such 
an extent that the two cannot be separated from one another” (Hansen, 2006:1). Which ideas 
are present in the discourses? Are the states doomed to make the unfortunate scenario of the 
past the self-fulfilling prophecy by assuming the roles of self-interested hostile players? These 
questions might be answered by taking a look at what kind of actor identities are emerging 
from the discourse of the Crimean events.  
Jackson (2006) in his analysis of the NATO’s Kosovo campaign discourse uses 
relational constructivist approach that analyzes the ongoing political process, rather than the 
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fixed sequence of events performed by the independent isolated agents. In his words, 
“practical activities… continually produce and reproduce the actor” (Jackson, 2006: 142). 
According to Campbell, “foreign policy helps produce and reproduce the political 
identity of the doer supposedly behind the deed” (Campbell, 1992: X), where “social and 
political life comprises a set of practices in which things are constituted in the process of 
dealing with them” (Campbell, 1992: 5).  
According to Wendt, “international politics is in part about acting on material incentives 
in given anarchic worlds. However, it is also about the reproduction and transformation - by 
intersubjective dynamics at both the domestic and systemic levels - of the identities and 
interests through which those incentives and worlds are created” (Wendt, 1994: 394). Wendt’s 
approach has played a crucial role for the IR theory, removing the states from the rigid 
established anarchy and giving them the possibility to create their own ones. By interacting 
with each other, states change the nature of their environment. 
Zehfuss’ critique of Wendt points out the contradictory approach to identity in his 
theory. While he gives the states the space to construct their identities and the environment 
around them, he at the same time takes state actors as established entities. State actors are 
viewed as simplified, united and separate from the social context, shifting from one stable 
identity to another. Thus, according to Zehfuss, it is unclear whether identity is constructed or 
given, - and the one, to a great extent, excludes the other. By analyzing the case of FRG and 
the debate over the deployment of the German troops she exposes the elements of identity 
building that don’t get mentioned by Wendt. Among those is the discursive dimension to 
identity construction. Namely, the discourse of the “insiders” that contributes to the 
construction and reconstruction of identities, rather than accepting state actors as entities 
which enter the relations with “outsiders” after emerging as stable and given. “The centrality 
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of physical gestures” as the actions of the state actor makes it impossible to include the 
discursive aspect in the identity transformation (Zehfuss, 2001: 326).  
It must be noted that Wendt does recognize the importance of “rhetorical practice”, 
pointing out that it, essentially, has a similar effect to behavioral practice, albeit using 
different means (Wendt 1994: 391). According to him, an important part of rhetorical practice 
is symbolic work, as well as persuasion and discussion about the Self and the Other, all of 
which serve to redefine identity and interest. 
Bourdieu (1991) adds to establishing relations between discourse and actors.  According 
to him, social actors engage in the act of “naming” in order to give structure to the world and 
to “act on the social world by acting on their knowledge of this world”, “to make and 
unmake” the groups whose actions may have the desired outcome on the structure of the 
world (Bourdieu, 1991: 127).  One group challenges the established order by “heretical 
discourse”, while the other engages in orthodox resistance, both of them “producing or 
reinforcing symbolically the systematic propensity to favor certain aspects of reality and 
ignore others” (Bourdieu, 1991: 135). Political actors engage in the political game by 
choosing the discourses “in the market”, struggling with each other for legitimization, for the 
symbolic power to produce ideas about the social world, which, in turn, serves to further 
strengthen their position of power. The necessity to balance own needs and the needs of those 
who these political actors supposedly represent creates the unintentionally “doubly 
determined” discourses (Bourdieu, 1991: 183). According to him, one of the most typical 
internal conflicts is a conflict between preserving the actor’s own distinctiveness and 
adherence to “traditional” (for it) principles, on one hand, and broadening the actor’s outreach 
in order to keep and extend the “right to speak”, on the other. That right is essential for the 
field of politics, where “to say is to do”, while “an ‘irresponsible discourse’ in mouth of one 
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person is a reasonable forecast made by someone else” (Bourdieu, 1991: 191). Naturally, 
every political leader strives to be the spokesperson whose discourses are perceived as 
reasonable, backed up by trust that the group has placed into that leader; this requires constant 
effort in observing the consistency of discourse and avoiding anything that might lead to 
being discredited and lose the power of “naming”. The latter, in particular, contributes to the 
“creation” of a group identity, as expressed by a speaker with authority in a “performative 
statement” (Bordieu, 1991: 125). Besides, the naming can be a weapon in the discursive fight 
between different actors. Slander is an extreme example of such use, but the regular 
“naming”, forcefully assigning an opponent to a certain group, can work as well. Competing 
actors produce competitive discourses. 
Departing from the anthropological Self of an actor, while justified, can result into 
quick descent into methodological chaos. Epstein (2010) claims that analyzing actor identity 
does not need to be based on a notion that an actor, such as an individual or a state, has got a 
Self – at least, not the “true” one, not the one relevant for the purposes of the discourse 
analysis.  
Rather than a “Self”, the discourse approach brings forward a “subject-position” - a 
position “carved out” in a discourse that the actors step in. It relies on the following three 
premises: speaking is acting, and language is thus an effective practical tool; social actors are 
speaking actors; pre-existing discourses regulate the actor behavior and structure the field of 
actions (Epstein, 2010). Thus the Self is rid of the mental baggage “inherited” from the human 
psychology, and the object of analysis becomes clearer. Epstein also notes that the discourse 
adopted by a certain state generally remains consistent; another important point is that it does 
not necessarily need to be voiced by official state representatives, such as a president or a 
prime minister, or by a state agency; the role of NGOs and domestic actors cannot be 
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neglected. In this light, including media discourse as well becomes very important for 
discourse-based analysis of identity construction. When, for the purposes of the analysis, 
states are what they speak, it also eliminates the difficulty of distinguishing between the 
change of behavior, or a stance, and the change of identity.  
Most constructivists agree that producing and reproducing the identity in most cases 
would require the presence, real or imaginary, of the “Other” – “the relationship with the 
other is the very site where…original identity takes shape” (Epstein, 2010: 337). 
While we have agreed that a “Self” is, in fact, a subject-position, the Other retains its 
important role in the discourse. Most constructivists agree that producing and reproducing the 
identity in most cases would require the presence, real or imaginary, of the “Other” – “the 
relationship with the other is the very site where…original identity takes shape” (Epstein, 
2010: 337). 
Practical activities, which take place in the context of international politics, are thus 
likely to include the creation of this Other from the suitable material – a (neighboring) state, a 
state union, a minority etc. The Other does not necessarily need to be hostile; according to 
Hansen (2006), “constructions of identity can take on different degrees of ‘Otherness,’ 
ranging from fundamental difference between Self and Other to constructions of less than 
radical difference, and the Other can be constituted through geographical representations as 
well as political representations such as ‘civilizations’, ’nations,’ ‘tribes,’ ‘terrorists,’ 
‘women,’ ‘civilians,’ or ‘humanity.’ The Other is often formed by juxtaposition between the 
privileged, superior, and devalued, inferior. Geographical and political constructions of 
identity are usually articulated with a particular temporal identity through themes of 
repetition, progress, transformation, backwardness, or development. Temporal representations 
locate a contemporary foreign policy question within a historical discourse, but they are, from 
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a poststructuralist perspective, precisely discourses: framings of meaning and lenses of 
interpretation, rather than objective, historical truths” (Hansen, 2006:6). 
While the Other does not necessarily need to be hostile, being presented as such is more 
likely to become a unifying factor for the Self, getting ready to combat – even albeit 
unwillingly – the dangerous Other. While identity-building is a complicated multifaceted 
process, rooted in the history, culture and economics, it may be safe to say identity-building 
of an international actor is greatly facilitated by a participation in an ideological or an armed 
standoff with the Other. Such standoff was evident during the Cold War, when ideological 
and economical differences, as well as arms race, were playing a crucial part for the identity 
formation. Since “danger is not an objective condition (Campbel 1992:1)”, the Other can be 
presented as dangerous by means of discourse.  
The C.A.S.E collective manifesto speaks of the securitization as a process ‘in which the 
socially and politically successful “speech act” of labelling an issue a “security issue” 
removes it from the realm of normal day-to-day politics, casting it as an “existential threat” 
calling for and justifying extreme measures’ (C.A.S.E collective manifesto, 2006).  Further it 
contains the following quote: “The capacity for a particular risk to be represented in terms of 
characteristics reviled in the community said to be threatened can be an important impetus to 
an interpretation of danger… the ability to represent things as alien, subversive, dirty, or sick 
has been pivotal to the articulation of danger in the American experience. In this context, it is 
also important to note that there need not be an action or event to provide the grounds for an 
interpretation of danger. The mere existence of an alternative mode of being, the presence of 
which exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus denaturalizes the claim of a 
particular identity to be the true identity, is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of 
a threat” (Connolly, 1991: 66).  
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The danger posed by the Other provides legitimation for exceptional measures. The 
identity formation in Hansen’s “discursive enactment of foreign policy” is linked to 
legitimization for the policies of the Self; “identities are thus articulated as the reason why 
policies should be enacted, but they are also (re)produced through these very policy 
discourses: they are simultaneously (discursive) foundation and product” (Hansen, 2005: 19).  
The identity building of Ukrainian and Russian state has been heavily influenced by 
historical circumstances and especially by geopolitical component.  At the time of the Maidan 
revolution both Ukraine and Russia have reached another crisis of identity. Ukraine has 
entered a new phase of state-building, inspired by the revolution; Russia has been for some 
years suffering the consequences of failing attempts to construct itself as a multicultural state. 
I will argue that the discourse around the Crimean crisis is a part and reflection of identity-
building process for both Ukraine and Russia.  
Research question: 
What is the role of the Crimean crisis discourse for the state identity-building of Ukraine and 
Russia? 
In Chapter 1 I have outlined the main historical discourses; I will assume that these 
discourses are still present today in some form. The Panslavic Unity and Civilizational 
Incompatibility discourses form the basis for the “hard” state-building, while the Union of 
Nations could be the background theme of the “reconciliatory” rhetoric. The relation exists 
between the position of a speaker as a political person and the contents and rhetoric they (and 
their speechwriters) will produce, as Wodak, de Cilia, Reisigl and Liebhart (2005) had noted. 
In my opinion, it is reasonable to expect from a political leader possessing real (as 
opposed to ceremonial) power to adopt the least compromising rhetoric in the times of 
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identity crisis; it is his or her role to consolidate the nation and to “drive a hard bargain”, to 
create an ideal that will take some time to achieve – which could also coincidentally be the 
time a given leader can stay in power. In other words, a political leader has two tasks: to 
shape or transform state identity, on one hand; and to further his or her political goals, on the 
other. 
Meanwhile, different political elites have different goals. The politicians managing 
foreign affairs are bound, according to the nature of their occupation, to maintaining balanced 
relationship with the other states. If the leader takes on the less compromising rhetoric 
stressing, for instance, a strong state and a strong leader, it might feel threatening for the other 
states. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs will adopt 
the reconciliatory, balancing approach, which will not be focused on furthering the ambitions 
of a certain leader, but rather on the interests of a state they are serving. 
Based on the historical background and theories, the following hypothetical relationship 
can be formulated: 
Hypothesis: 
H1. The Crimean crisis discourse contributes to the state identity transformation in Russia 
and Ukraine  
H1a. The discourse of political leaders representing the nation will be focused on national 
unity, strong state, and differentiating from the Other. 
H1b. The discourse produced by the diplomatic institutions will be focused on the common 
history and the need for cooperation.     
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Research Model 
The concept of intertextuality systematizes the interdependency of the foreign policy 
texts of different origins, formats and relevance; it examines their context and their role in 
drawing upon the textual past and constructing the textual future. The framework of official 
discourse can be complemented by a wide range of sources, from academic analysis to 
popular culture. Hansen (2006) offers four intertextual research models, starting with official 
policy discourse and gradually expanding to include the media and corporate institutions, 
culture, as well as marginal political discourses and illegal associations.  For the purposes of 
another research, it might be an interesting subject for a separate study to analyze the role of 
popular culture, namely, of the Internet-based aspect of it, in the construction of the Other. 
Social networks, in particular, have played an important part in creation and spreading of the 
memes and other modern phenomena on the topic of the Crimean events and Maidan, as well 
as of the short and catchy infographics. 
For the purposes of this thesis, based on the four models suggested by Hansen, I have 
chosen the following model, which focuses on the official discourse by different elites. 
Table 2 
Intertextual research model of discourse analysis 
Analytical focus Official discourse: 
Heads of states 
Governments 
Ministries 
Senior civil servants 
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Objects of analysis Official texts 
Political texts 
Parliamentary debates 
Speeches, statements 
Goal of analysis The response of official discourse to critical 
discourses 
The likely transformation of official discourse 
 
Research design 
There are a number of choices to make while formulating the research design, dictated 
by the peculiarities of the subject, as well as limitations of time and sources. Fairclough and 
Fairclough (2013) emphasize that political discourse analysis should take into account the 
distinctive nature of politics, namely, the role of practical argumentation. In their opinion, 
analysis of political discourse which is based on the assumption of the underlying practical 
argument can provide useful insight into, among others, the responses to the problematic 
situations. They suggest relying on the following structure for the practical argument: claim 
for action, circumstances, goals, values, means-goal. This structure might be more acceptable 
for the analysis of a speech rather than, say, an analytic article or a news piece. For the latter 
Fowler (2003) suggests looking at the following categories: stereotypes, frames, paradigms, 
schemata and general propositions. The official statements of the political leaders may be 
limited for discourse analysis in a sense that they have to adhere to certain legal terms and 
fixed constructions. 
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Hansen (2006) suggests starting with making the following choices: one Self versus 
multiple Selves, historical moment versus a longer historical development, and comparing 
foreign policy discourse of one or several events. 
For this research, since there is clearly a heated debate on the legitimacy and nature of 
the events in Crimea, it makes sense to analyze the competing discourses. Hansen (2006) 
refers to this kind of research design as “discursive encounter”, which “contrasts the discourse 
of the Self with the Other’s ‘counter-construction’ of Self and Other”, with the Other 
alternatively assuming the role of “an ally, a stranger, or an underdeveloped subject in need of 
help” (Hansen 2006:68). Indeed, “discursive encounters inevitably evolve around 
constructions of inferiority and superiority and hence a particular distribution of discursive 
and political power” (Hansen 2006: 76-77). To sum up, this will be the multiple-Selves 
research. 
In most conflict studies, there is difficulty in choosing the starting point of a conflict, 
since the participants most often share a long and complicated story leading to a certain event. 
Jackson (2006) mentions the problem of pinpointing the moment when “the ball got rolling”, 
or, in other words “some event or the procedure that either frees agents from their previous 
structural constraints so that they can innovate, or freezes the innovative actions of agents into 
a newly solid context for social actions” (Jackson, 2006:141). He argues that agent-structure 
problem is better tackled by relational approach, which focuses on the ongoing process of the 
social transaction, questioning both norms of the operation and the terms of the problem. In 
case of Crimean conflict, it might be tempting to say that the “magic moment” (in Jackson’s 
terms) has been uncharacteristically clear: the invasion into the Crimea. 
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It is, in essence, a study of the discourse surrounding a series of events known as “the 
conflict in Crimea”, starting from the mass deployment of the allegedly Russian troops, to the 
point of President Putin’s acceptation of the results of Crimean and referendum and its 
subsequent acceptation as a part of Russian territory.  For the purposes of building the 
research design I summarize the increase of Russian military presence in Crimea, preparation 
for referendum and the recognition by Russia of Crimea becoming a part of its territory as a 
single event. A single event study is logically limited to one moment in the temporal 
perspective. 
The research design can be presented in the following scheme: 
Crimean Crisis and National Identity 
 
Number of Selves Intertextual models Temporal perspective Number of events 
Two Selves: Ukraine 
and Russia 
Model 2: Wider 
political debate 
One moment: 
Crimean crisis 
Single event 
 
The data for the research will come from the primary sources. The sources of the 
official discourse will include the speeches, statements and interviews of the Prime Ministers, 
Presidents, and other representatives of the authorities. In cases of interviews and press 
conferences, media with the wide audience reach will provide primary source information. 
Nevertheless it is important to keep in mind that “all news is biased” (Fowler, 2013:7). 
Methods 
The aim of Critical Discourse Analysis is to reveal the patterns present in the discourse, 
when the subject of the research has been defined beforehand. In order to explore the identity 
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(trans)formation, it is necessary to place the relevant discourse in the historical context. 
Wodak et al (2009) outline three dimensions of analysis of national identity: contents, 
strategies, means and forms of realization. Based on their matrix of contents, and taking into 
account the research question, I assume that national unity and the image of the Other will be 
expressed in the following main themes: 
1. The narration of the common and different political past (same state and the attempts 
to break away from it, historical role of the breakup of the empire). 
2. The narration of a common culture (language issue, religion, Soviet culture) 
3. The construction of a “national body” (Crimea as a place for Russian glory, Ukraine’s 
territorial sovereignty). 
The strategic dimension of the national identity discourse includes constructive, 
transformative and destructive strategies (Wodak et al, 2009). 
Table 3 
Strategies and goals 
Strategies Goal Sub-strategies  
Constructive Constructing an identity, 
establishing and unifying the 
Self, differentiating from the 
Other 
Assimilation,  Inclusion, 
Continuation, Singularisation, 
Autonomization, Unification,  
Exclusion and discontinuation 
Transformative Transforming national 
identity 
Positive self-presentation, 
Autonomization, Discontinuation 
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Destructive Dismantling parts of national 
identities 
Discrediting opponents, Negative 
presentation, Exclusion, 
“Cassandra” strategy 
 
The means of realization for these strategies include the following tropes: 
- Metaphor (transferring of the characteristics of one object to the other based on a 
certain similarity); 
- Metonymy (naming an object through its characteristics); 
- Synecdoche (interchanging the whole with a part of it, or vice versa); 
- Allegory (presenting an abstract thought by a concrete action, example or description); 
- Epithet (words or expressions used to enhance the initial meaning); 
- Hyperbolization (deliberate exaggeration) 
- Irony (giving the word or expression the meaning that is the opposite to the initial 
one); 
- Sarcasm (the most extreme form of irony, bordering on mockery and exposing 
derogative attitude of the speaker). 
In the next chapter I will analyze how the above-mentioned themes are reflected in the 
official discourse. The narration of common political past, common culture and a national 
body are the themes that promote national unity as parts of transformative strategy, or, 
alternatively, create an Other as a part of destructive strategy. The reconciliatory approach 
will likely employ the same themes for constructive strategy. 
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Chapter 3. Who Speaks, What Do They Say And Why Speak At All? Discourse 
And Identity In Action 
3.1. Political Leaders: Balancing Ambitions And State  
Both Ukraine and Russia are, according to their constitutions, mixed republics. While a 
number of officials, such as different ministers, heads of the government, as well as chairmen 
of the parliaments are authorized to speak on behalf of the country, it is the president who 
represents the country abroad. It has been mentioned in Chapter 2 that a political figure is 
likely to have two factors influencing his or her discourse: a political vision for the issues in 
question, and the need to maintain legitimacy. Through several constitutional changes, both 
states’ political systems have accorded their presidents more than purely ceremonial and 
representational roles.  
Putin occupies a special position as a charismatic state leader. At some point he was 
seen as a part of the “macho-politics” trend, with his demonstratively masculine public image 
that involved tackling wild animals, bare-chested riding and guiding a flock of cranes through 
the air (Kramer, 2012). After serving two terms as a president, all the while enjoying wide 
popular support, he occupied the position of the prime minister for a term before being elected 
as President again. While the change in position served to satisfy the legal demand of no more 
than two terms per president, it was an open secret that the shift would be followed by another 
running for president, and subsequently, by another re-election in the absence of any viable 
competition. An editorial from Forbes.ru drew parallels between Putin’s rule and the Soviet 
Secretary Generals that ruled till death did them part with their position (“Twenty Signs Of 
Going Back To USSR”, 2014).   
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During Putin’s years in power a number of measures were adopted, the result of which 
was strengthening the power vertical – that is, the centralization of power. The lobbying of the 
regional powers in the Federation Council (the upper house of the parliament) was limited by 
the changes in its structure in 2000; the registration procedure for political parties and 
candidates became significantly more complicated (2001, 2009). Finally, a number of issues 
dealing with the central state power were excluded from the list of questions that could be 
raised at referendums, such as early ending of the presidential terms and the status of the 
federation subjects (Trofimov, 2012). With every subsequent reform, such as Internet 
censorship and state control over ambiguous “foreign agents”, “La Russie, c’est Poutine” to 
the greater extent was becoming the truth. 
In Ukraine, a certain constitutional confusion has existed for some time concerning the 
presidential powers. The original Constitution adopted in 1996 underwent a number of 
changes, limiting and restoring presidential power several times. Limiting the power of the 
president was a part of the deal reached between Maidan activists, opposition and the ruling 
elites; however, the deal was never actually completed. After the elected President 
Yanukovych stopped performing his duties and fled abroad, the acting president Turchynov 
stepped into his place. However, the powers of the President that has not been elected 
democratically were significantly limited by law, making Turchynov in many aspects a 
nominal figure. During the Crimean crisis the new head of the government, Yatsenyuk, 
emerged as a political actor with the most authority to act and to represent Ukraine 
internationally. 
After the Maidan events of 2013-2014, Yatsenyuk, a former opposition leader, received 
additional legitimization from his Maidan role and the previous status as the de facto leader of 
the popular oppositional Yulia Tymoshenko’s party during her imprisonment. It must be said 
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that the legitimization was tenuous at best: the “unholy trinity” of the opposition (Yatsenyuk, 
Klitchko and Tyahnybok), while almost permanently present at the site of events and 
attempting negotiations with the President, did not play any role crucial enough to grant 
political capital to either of them. Yatsenyuk, with his image of a “tame intelligentsia”, never 
enjoyed the popularity of his charismatic boss Tymoshenko. With the latter being temporary 
removed from the political activities, Yatsenyuk was granted his position in power as the most 
known for his previous activities (Klitchko was a relatively new face in politics and hesitant 
to play a bigger role), and the most moderate of the three (the nationalist Tyahnybok did not 
enjoy popular support due to being perceived as too radical). Competence and moderation 
were the qualities Yatsenyuk had to demonstrate n in order to not lose his legitimation and the 
opportunities for his future political career. 
Unlike Putin, Yatsenyuk could not rely on his personal popularity and charisma. In 
order to secure his “right to speak” (or, perhaps, to pave the road for Tymoshenko, who hasn’t 
been heard speaking for some time due to imprisonment), he had to adopt a different strategy.  
The key elements would be his Maidan activities and his background as a moderate educated 
politician. His strategy would be to assume the role of a politician of a Western make, sharing 
democratic values declared by Maidan and representing Ukraine as a democratic European-
oriented state. 
Another important behavioral characteristic he had to adhere to was to avoid at all cost  
appearing power-hungry; that one he swiftly adopted by stating in an interview: “We are 
ready to sacrifice our own ratings and our own political ambitions, since it is clear: for the 
opposition to enter the government at this moment is a political suicide. Two things are on the 
scale: either the suicide of the country or a political suicide of several politicians” 
(“Yatsenyuk Vvazhaye Politychnym Samohubstvom”, 2014). Political suicide is a powerful 
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metaphor, associated with self-sacrifice and disinterestedness. It also corresponded to the 
post-Maidan public opinion, which demanded the end to corruption in politics, radically new 
approaches to governing Ukraine, as well as certain idealism. 
3.2. Discourse Of The Leaders 
The Crimean crisis started to unfold after the end of the revolutionary events, when the 
new government was formed. Reports emerged about the increased military presence in 
Crimea of the possible Russian Black Sea fleet troops that have left their regular places of 
stationing. The conflict began to escalate between the pro-Russian forces refusing to 
recognize the new government in Kiev and Crimean Tatars supporting it, accompanied by the 
political crisis in the Crimean parliament. 
On March, 1 while commencing the meeting of the government Yatsenyuk made the 
following statement: “Ukraine will do everything for us to be a single state, to protect the 
rights of national minorities, and to make all the discussions about the possible takeover of 
Crimea a lie” (“Yatsenyuk Trebuet”, 2014).The reference to the rights of national minorities 
was most likely made in response to the previous mention of violation of human rights and 
rights of their compatriots by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Russia in their official 
twitter account. With major economic and corruption problems plaguing Ukraine for years, 
the issue of minority rights, unfortunately, never became a policy priority or even a major 
public concern 
It is important here to take into account the connection of minority rights with the 
notorious “language law” adopted in Ukraine in 2012 and authored by Kolesnichenko and 
Kivalov from the ex-president Yanukovych’s Party of Regions. The law aimed to create better 
possibilities for use and protection of local minorities’ languages in Ukraine. However, it was 
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never accompanied by the proper adaptation instruments. As I have discussed previously, 
language-related issues remain sensitive for Ukrainians due to a number of historical factors. 
At the time of adoption the law became a subject of heated discussions related to the future of 
Ukrainian language; additionally, it was seen as a distraction maneuver to divert people’s 
attention from corruption and economic problems. An attempt was made to repeal the law 
after the Maidan revolution, which gave formal grounds to speak about the violation of 
Russian-speaking minority rights. While speaking of minority rights, Yatsenyuk attempted to 
appeal to the Russophones of Crimea who refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new 
government. 
On the next day the official website of the President of Russian Federation reported the 
contents of the phone conversation with the President of the United States. Putin “drew 
attention to provocative, criminal actions of ultranationalist elements that are de facto 
encouraged by the current powers in Kiev…accented the presence of a real threat to life and 
health of Russian citizens and numerous compatriots currently situated on Ukrainian territory. 
Vladimir Putin stressed that in case of further spread of violence towards the eastern areas of 
Ukraine and to Crimea Russia will keep the right to protect own interests and the Russophone 
population residing there” (Telefonnuy Razgovor S Presidentom Obamoy, 2014). The 
legitimacy of the official powers in Kyiv was questioned due to their association with 
“ultranationalist elements”, with the Russophone population abroad being declared the 
priority interest of Russia. 
On March, 3 Yatsenyuk conducted a meeting with the European Business Association. 
Gas import into Ukraine was discussed, as he acknowledged that Ukraine-Russia gas trade 
relations are likely to become problematic due to the combination of pre-existing economic 
and new political problems. “We’ll find financial resources to pay the debt. Russia is 
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obligated to supply gas to Ukraine, Russia cannot use gas as weapon. We want a free and 
equal relationship with Russia” (“Rossiya Ne Dast Ukraine Skidku”, 2014). While the issue 
he has been discussing was of economic nature, the “free and equal relationship” clearly 
refers to a historically loaded problematic relationship with Russia, likely aggravated by the 
previously declared right to protect Russia’s interests beyond Russia’s state borders . 
On the same day, after the meeting with Ukrainian business representatives the acting 
Prime Minister received a carefully worded question from a journalist on whether Turkish, 
Italian and American frigates would consider repeating their Sea Breeze naval exercises. 
Yatsenyuk’s reply was the following:  
“What you are actually asking me is whether we are considering military option of the 
conflict resolution. It sounds nice, but let’s not turn to this not the most correct approach to 
the important issues of the regional security. You must be expecting a good laugh with the 
destroyers coming and solving all the problems. I will tell you honestly: we’ll have to solve 
our own problems. We’ll have to build our own destroyers, to restore the defense system of 
our state on our own, to restore the defense industry on our own (“Vtorzhenie v Ukrainu”, 
2014).  
Yatsenyuk exposed the allusion used by the journalist to underscore his own sincerity 
and openness. He combined the recognizable political cliché (“important issues of the 
regional security”) with the attempt to appeal to the audience (“a good laugh with the 
destroyers coming and solving all the problems”). He counteracted the unfavourable forecast 
(no military help for Ukraine) by using the sentiment popular among the Maidan activists (we 
did it ourselves) and indirectly promoting national unity (we’ll have to do it ourselves). 
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On March, 4 Putin held a press conference in Russian dedicated to the events in 
Ukraine. The discourse of his answers combined several themes.  
When speaking of the official powers in Ukraine, the President of Russia used the 
following word combinations: “illegal, anticonstitutional actions”, “dragging the country into 
chaos”, “so-called powers”, “leading to anarchy”, “anticonstitutional coup”, and “armed 
seizure of power”. “Masked, armed hitmen roaming Kiev” created the impression of a 
criminal, unsafe environment. Putin used irony and criminal slang when speaking about 
oligarch Kolomoyskiy, who received a position in power after Maidan: “as they say in our 
circles of enlightened intelligentsia, he conned [Abramovitch] out of his money… he is…a 
unique kind of crook” (“Vladimit Putin Otvetil Na Voprosu”, 2014).  
Putin mentioned “ultranationalist elements” being active in Ukraine in his phone call to 
Obama. In this interview he elaborated further on this topic by reminding about Hitler and 
armed groups playing part in his ascent to power in allusion to Maidan events, resulting in the 
“galore of neo-Nazi’s, nationalists, anti-Semites”.  The legitimacy of Ukrainian official 
powers was put into doubt by rhetorical questions: “There can be only one way to assess what 
happened in Ukraine – as an anticonstitutional coup and armed seizure of power. And no one 
is arguing with that. Who would argue with that?.. The question is: why was it done?” 
(“Vladimit Putin otvetil na voprosu”, 2014).  
The discourse of this interview clearly contained the image of the Other, alluding to the 
danger of Nazism. The rejection of this Other is very clear in the mainstream political forces 
in every European state; for Russia and Ukraine the victory over Nazis in the World War II is 
an especially powerful image. I have mentioned in Chapter 1 that this victory has become an 
important part of Russian identity and was recognized as such by the renewed attention in the 
last decades. 
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Evoking the imagery of the anti-Nazi fight plays a twofold role. First, it promotes 
national unity for Russian citizens; secondly, it is meant to extend the consolidating influence 
from the Russian citizens to Russophones everywhere. Similarly to how the victory was 
achieved by the Soviet Union, Russian speakers are encouraged to unite again to oppose the 
Nazi’s in Kiev. This aspect is indirectly supported by the smaller literary devices, such as the 
expression “simple Ukrainian muzhik”. This expression is a paraphrased and often used 
“simple Russian muzhik”, a simple Russian (peasant) man, a hard-working “real man”, 
dedicated bearer of traditional values.  A simple Ukrainian man thus becomes muzhik as well, 
and has the right to be protected by Russia. 
Another aspect of using the lexicon associated with Nazi is to draw on the imagery 
deeply rooted in the mass consciousness in order to draw the Other. Next to the war-time Nazi 
associations, the Other acquires another characteristic of the Soviet propaganda from the 
times of peace: the hostile Western influence. “Sometimes I’ve got the impression that the 
employees of some laboratory are sitting there somewhere behind a big puddle and 
conducting some experiments, like with laboratory rats, not understanding the consequences 
of what they are doing” (“Vladimit Putin Otvetil Na Voprosu”, 2014). 
The message of national unity further transcends state borders in the next fragments: 
“We leave for ourselves the right to use every means at our disposal to protect these 
[Russian-speaking] citizens. And we think it’s quite legitimate. It’s the last resort… I would 
like to tell you the following: we thought, we think and we’ll keep thinking that Ukraine is not 
only our closest neighbor, but, indeed, our neighborly brotherly republic…Of course, what I 
am about to say now is totally beyond my competence, and we are not going to interfere. But 
we think that all Ukrainian citizens, I repeat, wherever they are residing, should be getting 
equal rights to participate in the life of the country and in determining the future of this 
 Kadenko 39 
 
country… I want to stress again: we think that even if we make the decision, if I make the 
decision to use armed forces, it will be legitimate…and corresponding to our duties, in this 
case corresponding to our interests in protecting those people that we consider tightly 
connected to us historically and by common culture, tightly connected in economic sense… 
listen carefully. I want you to understand me clearly; if we make that decision it will be only 
to protect Ukrainian citizens. We assume that the current so-called powers, if they attempt to 
be considered civilized, have to ensure the safety of their citizens on the whole territory of 
their state, wherever they live. And we, of course, will be watching this closely”. (“Vladimir 
Putin Otvetil Na Voprosu”, 2014). 
Notably, the difference between the Russian-speaking Ukrainians, Russians living in 
Ukraine and Ukrainians living in Ukraine is very vague. Starting with the right to protect 
Russians, Putin extended this right to declare the duty to protect Ukrainian citizens as well, 
not specifying their nationality or spoken language. “Duty” was used multiple times; 
“brotherly republic” is a cliché from the times of the Soviet republics; “tightly connected to us 
historically and by common culture” provides further legitimation to interfere, despite the “we 
are not going to interfere” that has been said in the beginning. “I want to stress again”, “I want 
you to understand me clearly”, “we’ll be watching closely” convey the feeling of threat. 
It can be concluded that Putin’s discourse is formed around the notion of the strong, 
powerful state, willing and capable to establish own boundaries and led by a strong, 
somewhat aggressive leader. His discourse contains the message of unity and the multisided 
image of the “Other”. 
The reaction to this interview of Putin was a press conference where Yatsenyuk stated 
the following: 
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“The aggression of the Russian troops in Crimea is happening under a contrived pretext. 
The new government was formed, as foreseen by the agreement, while being supported by the 
constitutional majority, including the Party of Regions; the process of amending the 
Constitution has started, as agreed. The former President of Ukraine was the first to violate 
the agreement. Russia proceeds with its interference. One of the far-fetched pretexts was 
annulling the language law. The law remains in force. The rights of the Russian-speaking 
community are protected by the Art.10 of the Constitution and by law. We hope that Russia 
will realize the responsibility and that Russian troops will withdraw from Ukraine. Tomorrow 
at the government session we’ll make a decision on all Ukraine’s duties in Crimea.  We 
appeal to the Crimeans – we are one country, we have to be together and no one will split 
Ukraine” (“U Rosiyi Nemaye Pidstav”, 2014). 
Yatsenyuk used direct military-based rhetoric, calling Russia’s actions “aggression”, the 
reasons – “contrived”, saying that “Russia proceeds with its interference”. He goes on with 
legal speech to elaborate on the nature of agreement previously reached. To stress the unity of 
the nation he spoke about rights of Russophones, and in the end he substituted legal, dry 
jargon for an emotional appeal to the Crimeans. In doing so he switched from Ukrainian, the 
official language (“We appeal to the Crimeans”), to Russian, mostly spoken in Crimea: “We 
have to be together and no one will split Ukraine”, thus stressing the unity again. Where Putin 
spoke of “duties”, Yatsenyuk used “responsibility”, with duties being transferred to Ukraine: 
“Ukraine’s duties in Crimea”. 
Where the acting Prime Minister spoke of “free and equal relationship” before, now he 
invokes the “new style of relationship”: “Ukraine is ready to build a new style of relationship 
with Russia, on the condition of respect for its sovereign rights, and, namely, the choice of 
foreign policy priorities” (“Ukraina Nachala Konsul’tatsii”, 2014). With the progress of the 
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Crimean crisis that mirrors historical situation (Russia committing actions incompatible with 
the sovereignty of Ukraine), the acting Prime Minister proceeds further to clarify the 
previously mentioned “new style of relationship”. On March, 7 he says the following: 
“Ukraine will never be either Russia’s underling or a filial branch of Russia on the territory of 
Ukraine” (“Ukraina Nikogda Ne Budet Filialom Rossii”, 2014). While the respect for the 
sovereign rights might have been questioned by the increased Russian military presence in 
Crimea, Ukraine’s recent choice of foreign policy priorities (such as cooperation toward the 
Association agreement with the EU) was not officially criticized by Russia. Similarly to Putin, 
Yatsenyuk exploits the theme of political past, this time of Ukraine contesting Russia for the 
right to conduct independent policy, which evokes the familiar sentiment of a centuries-long 
fight with Russia for Ukraine’s independence.   
On March, 6 Yatsenyuk spoke at the press conference of the extraordinary meeting of 
EU Heads of State or Government on Ukraine in Brussels: 
“This is a crisis for entire Europe. 
“We as a state of Ukraine are strongly committed to our independence, to our territorial 
integrity, and we are sure that we will find… an exit strategy that will allow everyone to 
understand that Ukraine is an independent state. No one has the right to interfere into our 
domestic issues and everyone is interested in having peace and stability in Ukraine and in the 
region. The Ukrainian government is determined to sign the political Association Agreement 
and we are ready to sign it as soon as possible. 
“What we ask and what we urge… we urge the Russian government to pull back its 
military into barracks, not to support illegitimate, so-called government of Crimea and to start 
real talks and negotiations for the peaceful solution. I would reiterate again: to pull back 
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military, to stick to its international obligations, not to undermine Ukrainian independence 
and Ukrainian territorial integrity, and to do everything in order to stop this crisis.  And not 
to… support those who want Ukraine to split. The Ukrainian government already resumed 
talks with the IMF. And this is an indispensable condition to stabilize Ukrainian economy, we 
are ready to negotiate, we are ready to accomplish the deal, and we are ready to execute the 
deal that is to be signed between Ukraine and the IMF. 
“We wait for the final solution and for the final decision of EU member states, and we 
are sure that this decision will help Ukraine, will help Europe, to stabilize the situation , to 
calm down the situation and to start real talks, and real negotiations, in order to make them 
really successful, for the sake of Ukraine, for the sake of my people, for the future of Europe” 
(Press Conference of the Prime Minister of Ukraine, 2014). 
Notably, the statement is delivered in English. While not an extraordinary feat per se, 
and neither a requirement when plenty of interpreters could be employed, in the context of 
Ukrainian politics it is quite significant. The former president of Ukraine had the reputation of 
a not well-educated man, while the former prime minister could not even master Ukrainian 
language and delivered his speeches with extremely heavy Russian accent. Neither of them 
demonstrated knowledge of English, or of a different language other than Russian, on a level 
sufficient for professional communication. Therefore, the acting Prime Minister’s almost 
fluent English spoke volumes to the domestic public. It was a powerful tool to disassociate 
from the former powers and to present himself as an educated, European politician capable of 
bringing changes into the country, as well as capable of establishing working relations with 
foreign partners. 
 In course of speech Yatsenyuk used the personal pronoun “we” for the personified state 
of Ukraine, as well as for the newly formed government he is a head of. His speech 
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demonstrated the use of the rhetorical tool known as “rule of three” (“we are ready to 
negotiate, we are ready to accomplish the deal, and we are ready to execute the deal”; “to start 
real talks, and real negotiations, in order to make them really successful”; “for the sake of 
Ukraine, for the sake of my people, for the future of Europe”). It is likely that Putin’s message 
of duties and allusions to the Soviet past were seen as undermining Ukraine’s independence 
that Yatsenyuk mentions in the speech. Generally, the statement he made at a press 
conference after meeting European leaders was appropriately worded and reserved. The 
influence of the circumstances and audience can be seen clearly by comparing this statement 
with his speech on March, 9. 
The speech was delivered in Kyiv on the occasion of the 200th birthday anniversary of 
Taras Shevchenko, a revered, possibly the most famous, Ukrainian poet, powerful symbol of 
Ukrainian fight for independence from Russia. The speech on this occasion included quotes 
from Shevchenko’s poetry with intensive patriotic appeal: 
“It was the will of history that our time and our generation will bear the responsibility to 
fulfill Taras’ Testament… Against our people, against our families, against our European 
future the neighboring country has started military aggression. Our response to Russian 
federation is one: unity, confidence, determination, and faith in our true path. This is our land. 
Our fathers and grandfathers shed blood for this land, and we won’t give up a centimeter of 
Ukrainian land. May Russia and its president know about it. 
“Why do we have new power in Ukraine today? Because millions of Ukrainians came 
out and did what Shevchenko willed us to do. No silent slaves no more – but a worthy 
Ukrainian nation, which has proved to the whole world: “Battle on, and win your battle, God 
Himself will aid you” (“Nemaye teper rabiv nimyh”, 2014). 
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Notable is the antithesis of the European future to the “neighboring country”, Russia. 
National unity is promoted by narration of the political past (“Our fathers and grandfathers 
shed blood for this land”) and future through the present (“Why do we have new power in 
Ukraine today?”). Yatsenyuk speaks about takeover by Russia in a discussion at the Atlantic 
Council: 
 “The first scenario for President Putin is to take over Crimea in one or another form.  
But he can move further.  And they definitely have another case scenario – how to grab and to 
take over entire Ukraine, including the Ukrainian capital.  Again, it all depends on his 
personal goals.  You probably do remember his speech a few years ago saying that the biggest 
disaster of the last century is the collapse of the Soviet Union. I will say that the biggest 
disaster of this century would be the restoring of the Soviet Union” (Transcript: Discussion 
with Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 2014). 
On the UN Security Council meeting on March, 13 he again delivered a speech in 
English, but switched to Russian to address the Russian envoy Churkin: “I would like to 
address Russia. We are looking for an answer to the question: do Russians want war? I am 
convinced, as a prime minister of Ukraine, which for decades had warm friendly relationship 
with Russia – Russians do not want war. And I hope that Russian government and Russian 
President will listen to their people. We’ll go back to the negotiation table and solve this 
conflict immediately” (Vystup Arseniya Yatsenyuka na zasidanni Radu Bezpeku OON, 
2014).  
“Do Russians want war?” is a title of the popular song written in 1961 by a Soviet poet 
Evtushenko and subsequently branded by the officials as “demoralizing”. The song was meant 
to promote pacifism and question military involvement abroad of the USSR. Yatsenyuk is 
invoking a different side of the Soviet imagery, contrasting with Putin’s consolidating and 
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patriotic appeal of the common past. Additionally, a distinction between the Russian people 
and Russian official powers is stressed by the appeal to “listen to their people”. 
Yatsenyuk adopted a different rhetoric while speaking at the meeting of the government 
on March, 16, when an unrecognized referendum for a reunion with Russia took place in 
Crimea. Instead of allusions and legal speak he used threatening language, emotionally 
appealing expressions and metaphoric imagery: 
“Have not even the slightest doubt, Ukrainian state will find all instigators of separatism 
and splitting that are currently trying to destroy Ukraine’s independence under the cover of 
Russian militaries. We’ll find all of them! In a year, or two, we’ll bring them to justice and 
will try them in Ukrainian and international courts. The ground will burn under their feet! The 
responsibility for separatism and attempts to overthrow the constitutional order will come. 
There won’t be a place in the world where they will be feeling free, and Russia won’t protect 
them!” (Yatsenyuk obeshaet nakazat’ vseh zachinsgikov separatizma, 2014). 
On March 18, both Putin and Yatsenyuk made official statements related to the results 
of the Crimean referendum, followed by the inclusion of the Crimean republic into Russian 
federation. Putin addressed the members of the parliament and the Federation Council with 
the request to ratify the accord on the Crimean Republic and the city of Sevastopol becoming 
a part of Russian Federation. 
“To inderstand why such choice has been made it is enough to know history of Crimea, 
to know what Russia meant and means for Crimea and what Crimea meant and means for 
Russia. In Crimea literally everything is saturated with our common history and pride… 
Crimea is a unique merger of cultures and traditions of different peoples. In this it is so 
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similar to the big Russia, where no ethnos disappeared during the ages” (“Obrashenie 
Presidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii”, 2014). 
Putin used the narration of the common past to promote state unity, mentioning the 
baptizing of the leader of the Kievan Rus Prince Vladimir and his role for “joint base of 
culture, value, civilization that unite the people of Russia, Ukraine and Byelorus”. He 
depicted Crimea as a sacred place for the military victories and bravery feats of Russians 
through the ages. He re-examined the oppression of Crimean Tatars by stressing the 
oppression suffered by other nationalities in the USSR, by “mostly Russian people”, and 
painting the process of restoring the rights of the Tatars as something that only remains to be 
“fully finished”. 
Crimea as a part of Russian Federation Putin presented as a revival of the state he is a 
leader of, which is finally capable of exercising its right to protect Russians beyond the 
borders created by the split of the USSR. The latter is presented as an unfortunate fact for the 
Russians that have suddenly found themselves abroad, and, in case of Ukraine, in a country 
where “attempts were made to deprive Russians of their historical memory, to make them 
objects of forceful assimilation” (“Obrashenie Presidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii”, 2014).  
This quote was followed by the use of the word “samostiynist’”, which is a Russianized 
version of a Ukrainian word “independence”; it is often used ironically in a sense that the 
independence haven’t solved all the problems of Ukraine, as many representatives of the 
nationalist movements had imagined. In the next passage Putin mentioned the corruption 
problem plaguing Ukraine for decades and, as one of its consequences, millions of Ukrainian 
citizens that are forced to look for a “dirty work” abroad; he named their amount in Russia (3 
million) and their estimated earnings as “12% of Ukraine’s GDP”. This sequence conveys the 
feeling of superiority and contributes to the antithesis with the “Other” Ukraine. That “Other” 
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is not only corrupted and poor, but criminal (“neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites… 
leading Ukrainian life today”) and stupid “foreign sponsors of the [so-called “powers”] 
are…unlike them, smart people”. Additionally, this Other is related to the enemy defeated in 
the World War II (“Ukrainian ideological followers of Bandera, Hitler’s crony in the Second 
World War”). Putin assigns to the West the role of the hypocritical Other, who believe that 
they are “chosen and special”, by drawing parallels between self-determination of Kosovo and 
Crimea. 
The speech also contains the “strong state against the others” rhetoric:  “We are 
constantly being pushed into a corner for having an independent position, for standing up for 
it, for calling things by their names and not being hypocritical. But everything has got limits... 
Russia found itself at the point it cannot retreat further” (“Obrashenie Presidenta Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii”, 2014). 
In the end, the distinction is made to exclude Ukrainian people from the “Otherness” by 
the unity discourse and the narration of the common past: “I will tell you sincerely, with pain 
in our soul we are watching the events in Ukraine… And our concern is understandable, since 
we are not just close neighbors, we are actually, as I have said many times, one people. Kiev 
is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus’ is our common source, and we’ll never be able 
to do without each other” (“Obrashenie Presidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii”, 2014). 
While Putin was appealing to the common past of the people from Rus, Yatsenyuk 
released the televised address aimed for the residents of the South and East of Ukraine. His 
speech started and ended in Ukrainian, but the main body was in Russian.  
He promotes national unity by juxtaposing “outsider warmongers” with the 
Russophones of Ukraine. For the latter, he elaborates on their legal rights to use Russian; he 
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creates the feeling of familiarity by mentioning the Eastern Ukrainian origin of the acting 
President he’s working with, as well as the fact that his own wife speaks Russian most of the 
time “without need for protection from Kremlin”. The need for good relations with Russia is 
stressed, despite the “armed military aggression”; the NATO membership is, according to 
him, not on the agenda “exclusively to preserve unity of Ukraine”; and he claims to be 
personally against forbidding the former President’s Party of Regions, which mostly enjoyed 
popularity in East and South. 
The main body of the speech contains consolidating rhetoric: “[recovering the 
economy] is our joint task…Diversity is not our drawback. It makes us rich. And Ukraine 
unites us all” (Address by Prime Minister of Ukraine Arsenii Yatseniuk, 2014). 
Signing of the political part of the Association agreement with the EU was an important 
step for the post-revolutionary government, as well as for the former Maidan protesters (the 
initial reason for Maidan to gather was the refusal of the former president to sign the 
Agreement).  On March, 21, during the press conference after the signing ceremony, 
Yatsenyuk called energy and gas the potential “new nuclear weapon” of Russia. 
Ukrainian media quoted his saying: “Russia will punish Ukraine. Which would have 
happened anyway. They will be, first of all, damaging Eastern Ukraine. They’ll be doing it on 
purpose, to destroy our industry, to make life of Ukrainians worse” (“Rossiya povodyt’ sebe 
yak gangster”, 2014). “God knows the final destination. Is it Ukraine, or is it the EU? What’s 
happening to the world today? What’s up? Russia decided actually to impose a new post-Cold 
War order? And to revise the results of the Second World War? This is the truth” (“Low-Key 
Ceremony Marks Signing Of Ukraine’s EU Association”, 2014). While the portrayal of 
Russia in his discourse is clearly negative, this is not a careful, multi-sided formation of the 
Other that could be seen in Putin’s speeches. The comments of Yatsenyuk rather convey the 
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feeling of distress and disappointment, as well as inability to change things. This contrasts 
with the “strong state” rhetoric of Putin. 
3.3. Supporting Official Discourse: Ministries And Diplomatic Representatives 
The official start of the crisis in Crimea could be pointed to the February, 27, when the 
MFA of Ukraine presented a note to the charge d’affairs of Russia expressing protest on the 
occasion of the breaching of the air space of Ukraine and violation of the agreement on the 
Black Sea fleet of Russian Federation stationed in Crimea (“Do MZS Ukrayinu Vyklykano 
Tymchasovogo Povirenogo RF”, 2014).  On February, 28 a similar note was presented to 
Russian diplomatic representatives expressing protest, as well as additionally stressing the 
absence of request from Ukraine for any kind of military action to be taken by Russia (“MZS 
Ukrayiny Vyslovylo Protest”, 2014).  
These formal diplomatic actions were accompanied by a less formal discursive 
encounter through official channels. On February, 27 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
of Russia published the following on their official twitter account: “The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Russia will keep standing up for the rights of compatriots on the international arena 
and reacting harshly and without compromise to the facts of their violation”; “Mass human 
rights violations happening in Ukraine, such as discrimination, attacks, vandalism, are a 
subject of major concern @UnitedNationsRU” (MFA of Russia, 2014).  
On March, 1 MFA of Russia posted a statement expressing “deep concern” about the 
attempt of takeover of the building where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Crimea was 
based. Their wording includes “treacherous provocation”, “certain political circles in Kiev”. 
(“Zayavlenie MID Rossii Po Sobytiyam V Krymu”, 2014). The MFA of Ukraine reacted 
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immediately by the “appeal to the Russian side not to spread false information and not to 
resort to the blatantly provocational steps” (“Zayava MZS Ukrayiny”, 2014). 
On March, 3 MFA of Russia posted a statement in reaction to the comment of the US 
State Secretary: “Without taking effort to understand complicated processes ongoing in 
Ukrainian society to create an unbiased evaluation of the situation that continues degrading 
after the force coup by radical extremists in Kiev. The state Secretary is applying the Cold 
War clichés , suggesting “punishment“ of  Russian Federation instead of those who staged a 
coup d’état ” (“Zayavlenie MID RF V Svyazi S Vyskazuvaniyami Gossekretará SSHA O 
Situatsii Na Ukraine”, 2014). The statement featured references to the following actions by 
the new powers: “desecration of the memory of the heroes of World War II”, “militant 
Russophobia”, “a war on Russian language and everything associated with it”. “Ukraine 
might be nothing but a territory for geopolitical games for certain Western politicians, but for 
us it’s a brotherly country connected to us by many centuries of common history”. 
(“Zayavlenie MID RF V Svyazi S Vyskazuvaniyami Gossekretará SSHA O Situatsii Na 
Ukraine”, 2014). Here the themes of the World War II and Western influence can be seen, 
along with the promoting unity by “brotherly” rhetoric. 
MFA of Ukraine posted no official response to the statement of the US State Secretary. 
The statements and briefing notes from the following days were mostly formulated in formal 
legal language detailing the violations of international law by the Russian Federation. 
However, an appeal to “Russian side” was present again: accusations in “blatant 
disinformation”, addressed to Russian media (“Shodo poryshennya rosiys’koyu storonoyu”, 
2014), followed by “Russian side is resorting to the tough moral and psychological pressure 
on the Ukrainian side (“Ohl’yad podiy navkolo Avtonomnoyi Respubliky Krym”, 2014).  
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Notable is that the discourse of the official bodies from both countries draws a clear 
distinction between the people and the official state powers, which are acquiring the role of 
the Other. The distinction is somewhat less clear in the discourse of Ukrainian MFA that uses 
an ambiguous term “Russian side, but certain statements remove the ambiguity: “Ukraine 
does not wish war with Russian people, with whom we have so much in common. I am 
convinced that Russians do not wish a confrontation with Ukrainians either” (“Komentar 
MZS Shodo Resolutsii EP”, 2014).  
Conclusions 
The goal of the research was to explore the role of the Crimean crisis discourse for the 
state identity-building of Ukraine and Russia. I started with the assumption that the discourse 
of political leaders representing the nation will be focused on national unity, strong state, and 
differentiating from the Other.  
The discourse of the President of Russia went beyond the construction of national body 
by including Ukraine into the domain of Russia. He employed the narration of the common 
political past and the common culture to promote (trans)national unity and strong state. The 
construction of the Other were likewise often present and well-developed.  
The acting Prime Minister of Ukraine paid considerably more attention to his internal 
political circumstances and the legitimation of his own power position. Taking into account 
Maidan-inspired patriotism, in order to promote unity he exploited the theme of the common 
past against the oppressive Russian Other. However, his narrative of the Other was one-
dimensional and bleak compared to the complicated construction by the Russian President. 
The strong state narrative was mostly absent. Therefore, Hypothesis 1a was confirmed: 
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national unity, strong state, and differentiating from the Other as the factors influencing state 
identity transformation were present in the discourse of political leaders. 
The official diplomatic discourse, while limited by the stylistic and other professional 
requirements, nevertheless usually manages to convey a clear message within the frames of 
the given discourse. It could be observed that diplomatic discourse of Russian institutions 
actively featured the formation of the Other and the strong state. The discourse of Ukraine 
largely remained within the professional limitations without prominently featuring any of the 
themes. Therefore it can be concluded that Hypothesis 1b was not confirmed: the discourse 
produced by the diplomatic institutions was not focused on the common history and the need 
for cooperation.  
Future research suggestion for this topic is a broader discourse analysis, including 
mainstream and marginal media, political opposition, as well as, perhaps, social media 
discourse. If the current renewed interest in European and world order and Russian 
civilizational mission is any indication, the small Crimean peninsula has been covering a 
sizeable can of geopolitical worms.
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